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THE WOLF WE FEED: 
DEMOCRACY, CASTE, AND LEGITIMACY 
Benjamin Justice* and Tracey L. Meares** 
Legal authority rests on enactment; its pure type is best represented by bureau-
cracy. The basic idea is that laws can be enacted and changed at pleasure by 
formally correct procedure. The governing body is either elected or appointed 
and constitutes as a whole and in all its sections rational organizations. . . . 
Obedience is not owed to anybody personally but to enacted rules and regula-
tions which specify to whom and to what rule people owe obedience. The per-
son in authority, too, obeys a rule when giving an order, namely ‘the law,’ or 
‘rules and regulations’ which represent abstract norms. The person in com-
mand typically is the ‘superior’ within a functionally defined ‘competency’ or 
‘jurisdiction,’ and his right to govern is legitimized by enactment. 
—Max Weber1 
 
It must be remembered that the white group of laborers, while they received a 
low wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological 
wage. They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because they were 
white. They were admitted freely with all classes of white people to public func-
tions, public parks, and the best schools. The police were drawn from their 
ranks, and the courts, dependent upon their votes, treated them with such le-
niency as to encourage lawlessness. Their vote selected public officials, and 
while this had small effect upon the economic situation, it had great effect up-
on their personal treatment and the deference shown them. White schoolhous-
es were the best in the community, and conspicuously placed, and they cost 
anywhere from twice to ten times as much per capita as the colored schools. 
The newspapers specialized on news that flattered the poor whites and almost 
utterly ignored the Negro except in crime and ridicule. 
—W.E.B. Du Bois2 
 
 * Professor of Education and (by courtesy) History, Rutgers University. 
 ** Walton Hale Hamilton Professor and Co-Faculty Director of the Justice Collabora-
tory, Yale Law School. The authors would like to thank Phillip Atiba Goff, Paul Gowder, Eliza-
beth Hinton, Leah Mirakhor, Jennifer Richeson, Tom Tyler, and participants in a workshop on 
the Reckoning and Reformation journal symposium. All errors are our own. 
 1. Max Weber, The Three Types of Legitimate Rule, 4 BERKELEY PUBL’NS SOC’Y & 
INSTS. 1, 2 (1958). 
 2. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 700–01 (Free Press 1998) 
(1935). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Procedure is central to American public legal discourse.3 From the soar-
ing rhetoric of the Declaration of Independence to the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the American legal tradition rests on the prin-
ciple that law must be both derived and applied according to fair process.4 
Consider that in the 2020 election the Trump Administration resorted to 
fervent and false allegations of widespread voter fraud5—that the election 
process was fundamentally unfair—in order to weaponize Republican voters’ 
ostensible commitments to fairness against what was, objectively, one of the 
least procedurally unfair elections in history.6 Yet the four-year period of the 
Trump Administration (2017–2021) also saw the rise of overt and deliberate 
racist politics and mounting evidence that a universal commitment by all to 
fairness for all across the United States is a mythical framing of the American 
 
 3. See John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541 
(1978). See generally ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988) 
(presenting what was at the time a revolutionary interdisciplinary theoretical approach to 
teaching procedure). 
 4. The Declaration states the doctrines of political equality and representative govern-
ment as legitimizing, which are at the heart of fair derivation and application of legal authority: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. —That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The relevant passage from Four-
teenth Amendment reads: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 5. See Jim Rutenberg & Nick Corasaniti, Behind Trump’s Yearslong Effort to Turn Los-
ing into Winning, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/us
/politics/trump-voter-fraud-claims.html [https://perma.cc/XYJ9-VNXR]. 
 6. See Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council 
& the Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees, CYBERSECURITY & 
INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/joint-
statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election [https://perma
.cc/94BY-LLKQ]. We say “least unfair” and not “most fair” because the districting system and 
Electoral College are deeply unfair legal structures that allocate extra political power to rural 
and suburban white voters who, not coincidentally, tend to vote for the Republican Party. See 
Ian Millhiser, The Astounding Advantage the Electoral College Gives to Republicans, in One 
Chart, VOX (Sept. 17, 2019, 7:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/17
/20868790/republicans-lose-popular-vote-win-electoral-college [https://perma.cc/Z9RH-
5C85]; Michael Wines, What Is Gerrymandering? And How Does It Work?, N.Y. TIMES (June 
27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/what-is-gerrymandering.html 
[https://perma.cc/SVT9-BKPA]. 
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creed.7 One can look from the apparent lack of justice for unarmed Black ci-
vilians killed by police officers to a sitting President’s affirmative support for 
white supremacist groups to observe the doublespeak associated with fascist 
regimes: claiming to be restoring law and order while backing away from 
commitments to due process and equal protection.8 And yet, simultaneously, 
we have also seen the mainstreaming of a successful oppositional politics, 
including Black Lives Matter, which in June 2020 enjoyed a peak 67 percent 
approval rating among American adults in a national survey.9 Even as white 
nationalism flourished under the Trump Administration, polls indicate that 
increasing numbers of Americans acknowledge that our society is unfair to 
racial minorities.10 As Americans stand at the perpetual racial crossroads of 
the twenty-first century, how much does the legitimacy that they accord 
their government depend on the procedural justice it delivers to all?11 
The question of state legitimacy is the province of many disciplines. In 
this Essay we consider the question from a social-psychological perspective 
 
 7. On increases in hate crimes and groups, see Mark Potok, The Year in Hate and Ex-
tremism, INTEL. REP. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-
report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism [https://perma.cc/EX2P-52BS]; Hate Crime Statistics, 
2019, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2019/topic-pages/incidents
-and-offenses [https://perma.cc/3USY-6KUK]. 
 8. See JASON STANLEY, HOW FASCISM WORKS (2018); Jessica Huseman & Annie 
Waldman, Trump Administration Quietly Rolls Back Civil Rights Efforts Across Federal Gov-
ernment, PROPUBLICA (June 15, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-
administration-rolls-back-civil-rights-efforts-federal-government [https://perma.cc/49LR-
4EHL]; Katie Benner, Trump’s Justice Department Redefines Whose Civil Rights to Protect, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/us/politics/civil-rights-justice-
department.html [https://perma.cc/R8YN-GSPR]. On Trump’s support for white supremacist 
groups, see, for example, Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Trump Gives White Supremacists 
an Unequivocal Boost, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08
/15/us/politics/trump-charlottesville-white-nationalists.html [https://perma.cc/NMC9-FBWL]; 
Trump Refuses to Denounce White Supremacy in Chaotic Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021, 3:20 
PM), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/09/29/us/presidential-debate-trump-biden 
[https://perma.cc/8L37-DW98]. 
 9. See Deja Thomas & Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Support for Black Lives Matter Has 
Decreased Since June but Remains Strong Among Black Americans, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT 
TANK (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/16/support-for-black-
lives-matter-has-decreased-since-june-but-remains-strong-among-black-americans 
[https://perma.cc/HYK3-MBAK]. 
 10. Voters’ Attitudes About Race and Gender Are Even More Divided Than in 2016, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/09/10/voters-
attitudes-about-race-and-gender-are-even-more-divided-than-in-2016 
[https://perma.cc/9M7H-F9BW]. 
 11. In this Essay, when we refer to procedural justice we rely upon a particular defini-
tion of it found in empirical literatures centered primarily in social psychology. While it is true 
that there are different definitions of this term, especially outside of the province of social sci-
ence, we do not mean to be describing merely commitments to compliance with constitutional 
jurisprudence specifying adherence to particular procedures. For an explanation of the distinc-
tion we are drawing here, see Tracey L. Meares, Tom R. Tyler & Jacob Gardener, Lawful or 
Fair? How Cops and Laypeople Perceive Good Policing, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 297, 
301 (2015). 
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and focus on the centrality of process to the public’s perceptions of fairness. 
What we find is a contradiction. The social psychology of procedural justice 
focuses empirically on what people say matters to them in coming to conclu-
sions about whether an authority, institution, or social arrangement is right, 
appropriate, and just.12 This scholarship tells us that people, no matter their 
group membership, reach conclusions about the fairness and legitimacy of 
legal authorities by relying much more on how individuals are treated by le-
gal authorities than on the outcomes of decisions those authorities produce. 
Moreover, this research supports the notion that members of one group be-
lieve that members of groups to which they do not belong should also be 
treated by authorities in the ways they want authorities to treat their own 
group, registering less support for authorities that do not.13 The social psy-
chology of intergroup relations, however, undermines the ideas of univer-
sality that procedural justice research promotes. For example, psychological 
experiments demonstrate that, when primed, white respondents (because 
they are members of the dominant group) view Black people with overt and 
subconscious suspicion and are more likely to support harsher punishments 
for them—two clear examples that potentially call into question the belief by 
all in fairness for all racial groups.14 One implication of these and other stud-
ies is that whites may well support different treatment of Blacks than whites 
along lines that the procedural justice research seems to refute, and, moreo-
ver, consider such different treatment in their judgments about whether the 
government is legitimate. 
This apparent paradox reflects a deeper rift in theories of state legitima-
cy. The study of procedural justice research flows from the Western (white) 
political-philosophical tradition fully articulated in the early twentieth cen-
tury by Max Weber, which presupposes that liberal democracies derive their 
legitimacy from universally fair treatment, such that disparate treatment of 
any group erodes the legitimacy of state authority and weakens the rule of 
law.15 The analysis of racial bias in civic identity and behavior flows from the 
African American philosophical tradition, fully articulated in the early twen-
tieth century by W.E.B. Du Bois, a contemporary of Weber’s. This tradition 
presupposes the United States to be a caste society in which disparate treat-
ment of racial minorities is an expected role for state authority, observing 
that caste was written into law such that the democratic norms of white soci-
ety operated in uneasy tandem with the antidemocratic demands of white 
 
 12. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (Princeton Univ. Press 2006) 
(1990); see also Rick Trinkner, Clarifying the Contours of the Police Legitimacy Measurement 
Debate: A Response to Cao and Graham, 14 ASIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 309 (2019). 
 13. See infra notes 58–66 and accompanying text. 
 14. See JENNIFER L. EBERHARDT, BIASED: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE THAT 
SHAPES WHAT WE SEE, THINK, AND DO 130, 146 (2019). 
 15. See Weber, supra note 1. 
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supremacy.16 Du Bois also noted that the problem of anti-Blackness was not 
national but global, sitting right alongside the supposed march of progress 
through European imperialism.17 In the late twentieth century, Critical Race 
Theory emerged to understand the contradiction Du Bois condemned—how 
democratic legitimacy can sit side by side with caste legitimacy, each indicat-
ing a set of deeply ingrained expectations of the law even after overt racial 
caste law has been abolished.18 
Does state legitimacy in the United States depend on democratic norms 
of procedural justice, or caste norms of white supremacy maintenance? Our 
answer to the question is, in each instance, “probably yes,” and we do not at-
tempt a definitive answer. Within this apparent disjuncture in theory and 
scholarship, however, we see opportunity. It is clear from our review of the 
literature that the study of legitimation mechanisms, especially in psycholo-
gy, has yet to fully account for the ways in which people’s commitments to 
procedural justice relate to their commitments to racial hierarchy mainte-
nance. Understanding more clearly how and in what circumstances these le-
gitimizing evaluations are enacted could contribute to better strategies for 
political discourse and lawmaking generally and better responses to the ur-
gent need for police reform and reconceptualization of public safety.19 
Our exploration proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, we briefly sketch the 
genealogy and current state of empirical research on democratic legitimacy, 
with special attention to procedural justice. In Part II, we similarly examine 
social-psychological research on caste legitimacy, with an emphasis on four 
topics of special relevance: commitments to hierarchy, racialized suspicion, 
punishment, and deservingness. In Part III, we propose a research agenda 
for bridging the divide we identify and highlight promising emerging schol-
arship and its implications for policy reform. 
I. THE THEORY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
The idea that procedural fairness is necessary to the legitimacy of demo-
cratic forms of government is an old one in European political theory. As 
 
 16. Within the DuBois canon, Black Reconstruction probably represents the best articu-
lation of this idea, in that he offers the notion of whiteness as a wage, which is the foundations 
of caste legitimacy. See DU BOIS, supra note 2. 
 17. See W.E.B. DU BOIS, COLOR AND DEMOCRACY (1945), reprinted in THE WORLD AND 
AFRICA AND COLOR AND DEMOCRACY 233, 300–01 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2007). 
 18. We define democratic legitimacy (as we suggest above) as a theory that explains the 
perceived legitimacy of the law based on its conformity to basic premises of a liberal democra-
cy, including equality of rights, limited and responsive government, and individual autonomy. 
We define caste legitimacy as a theory that explains the perceived legitimacy of law based on its 
conformity to the basic premises of a caste society—inequality by group identity, including 
unequal enjoyment of limited and responsive government and of autonomy. 
 19. See Tracey L. Meares, Policing: A Public Good Gone Bad, BOS. REV. (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://bostonreview.net/law-justice/tracey-l-meares-policing-public-good-gone-bad 
[https://perma.cc/H9MU-VYYE]. 
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early modern European empires rode the rising tide of global, imperial capi-
talism, European philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
developed political taxonomies describing the relationships between rulers 
and the ruled, including the possibility that whole societies could, in the 
right conditions, rule “themselves.”20 While social-contract theory argued 
that what made any form of government legitimate to the governed was the 
protection of their natural rights, it was Montesquieu who suggested that 
people actually learned from the character of government itself (not just the 
outcomes it produced). In a republican form of government, he argued, the 
people must learn to love the laws that govern them.21 The reasonable and 
predictable pursuit of justice through law, he argued, was essential for that 
love.22 
By the early twentieth century, Max Weber fully realized a theory of 
proceduralism in democracy: “Obedience is not owed to anybody personally 
but to enacted rules and regulations which specify to whom and to what rule 
people owe obedience. The person in authority, too, obeys a rule when giv-
ing an order, namely ‘the law,’ or ‘rules and regulations’ which represent ab-
stract norms,” he wrote. “The person in command typically is the ‘superior’ 
within a functionally defined ‘competency’ or ‘jurisdiction,’ and his right to 
govern is legitimized by enactment.”23 In 1971, John Rawls’s publication of A 
Theory of Justice marked another watershed.24 Rawls theorized that fairness 
is something best generated “behind a veil of ignorance,” whereby people 
agree on principles of justice before knowing what their later position will be 
in the application of those principles.25 
Importantly, over the centuries these and other (white) theorists also de-
veloped mechanisms for rationalizing the unprecedented scale of exploita-
tion, suffering, and illegitimate governance that fueled the material 
enrichment and democratization of European societies and their white colo-
nies. As Charles Mills has argued, the European “social contract” tradition in 
Western philosophy that so deeply shaped the legal system of the United 
States implicitly and explicitly relegated colonized and nonwhite people to 
 
 20. We highlight the context in which modern theories of democracy arose in order to 
frame the origins of modern ideas about democracy in the context of the European imperial 
racial caste system. In the American context, the now-classic framing of this duality is 
EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM (1975). For an analysis of the 
suppositions this context of caste produced in the development of the social-contract theory 
that lays the foundation for our constitutional form of government, see CHARLES W. MILLS, 
THE RACIAL CONTRACT (1997). 
 21. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 35–36 
(Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller & Harold S. Stone eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Weber, supra note 1, at 2. 
 24. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press rev. 
ed. 2009). 
 25. Id. at 118, 118–23. 
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subpersonhood outside the civic ken, reflecting a durable racial contract.26 
Locke, Hume, Kant, Jefferson, and other Enlightenment thinkers founda-
tional to American political philosophy explored racial taxonomic justifica-
tions for white settlerism and enslavement.27 These justifications emphasized 
the innate or cultural inferiority of nonwhites and contributed to the rise of 
scientific racism and social Darwinism over the long nineteenth century.28 
By the early twentieth century, prominent theories of liberal democracy 
conceptually erased or simply ignored the antidemocratic political and eco-
nomic systems that they were built upon. In his celebrated works on political 
theory, for example, John Dewey wrote nothing accounting for American’s 
racial caste system in his theory of democracy as a “mode of associated liv-
ing.”29 His contemporary, Max Weber, moved away from biological racism 
over the course of his career, but continued to hold ambiguous, neoracist be-
liefs with regard to culture, and adopted a race-blind stance in his account of 
the workings of liberal democracy rooted in proceduralism.30 John Rawls’s 
monumental work on justice not only imagined an ideal model free from 
race, but also spawned decades of philosophical churn that, itself, also ig-
nored race, racism, and racial justice.31 
The study of justice within psychology is relatively recent.32 Tom R. Ty-
ler has described this engagement as a series of “waves,” beginning in the 
1950s and 1960s with the study of relative deprivation and distributive jus-
 
 26. See MILLS, supra note 20. 
 27. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND RACE (Naomi Zack ed., 2017); 
MILLS, supra note 20; Christa Dierksheide, “The Great Improvement and Civilization of That 
Race”: Jefferson and the “Amelioration” of Slavery, ca. 1770–1826, 6 EARLY AM. STUD. 165 
(2008); David Armitage, John Locke: Theorist of Empire?, in EMPIRE AND MODERN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 84, 110 (Sankar Muthu ed., 2012). 
 28. The long nineteenth century, 1789–1914, is a more useful chunking of time than 
1800–1900 for explaining broad political phenomena in Europe and its empires. See generally 
HELMUT WALSER SMITH, THE CONTINUITIES OF GERMAN HISTORY: NATION, RELIGION, AND 
RACE ACROSS THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY (2008). 
 29. Although Dewey supported the creation of the NAACP, Dewey’s writings on race in 
any context are scant. See THOMAS D. FALLACE, DEWEY AND THE DILEMMA OF RACE: AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, 1895–1922, at 120, 168 (2011). 
 30. See Ernst Moritz Manasse, Max Weber on Race, 14 SOC. RSCH. 191 (1947); Michael 
Banton, Updating Max Weber on the Racial, the Ethic, and the National, 14 J. CLASSICAL 
SOCIO. 325 (2014); Andrew Zimmerman, Decolonizing Weber, 9 POSTCOLONIAL STUD. 53 
(2006). Scholars disagree sharply on Weber’s views on race, in part because he viewed it some-
what analogously to ethnicity. His own travels in the United States sensitized him to the func-
tion of race-status for poor whites, for example, id. at 56, but our point here is that Weber did 
not adequately integrate race legitimacy into his account of proceduralism in liberal democra-
cies. 
 31. See Charles W. Mills, Retrieving Rawls for Racial Justice? A Critique of Tommie Shel-
by, 1 CRITICAL PHIL. RACE 1, 1–4 (2013); RAWLS, supra note 24, at 85–87. 
 32. Tom R. Tyler, A History of Justice and Morality Research, in HANDBOOK OF THE 
HISTORY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 453, 453 (Arie W. Kruglanski & Wolfgang Stroebe eds., 
2012). 
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tice.33 These studies, often facilitated by large federal grants, reflected post-
war efforts to understand and avoid authoritarianism.34 They posed ques-
tions such as: What led individuals to become politically dissatisfied or to 
identify with authoritarian regimes? Why, and under what circumstances, 
did they accept or reject inequality? Justice in these studies assumed an in-
strumentalist orientation and focused primarily on objective and subjective 
outcomes.35 Rawls’s innovation—the development of an idealized mecha-
nism for maximizing fairness by randomizing future position—should be 
understood against the background of this research. 
Procedural justice as a distinct field within psychology was itself a reac-
tion to Rawls, and like Rawls’s work was uninterested, at least initially, in 
America’s distinctive racial caste system.36 In 1974 Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, 
and Holden published Procedural Justice as Fairness, a provocative study that 
presented itself as a significant corrective to A Theory of Justice.37 Rather 
than defining justice in terms of the anticipation of outcomes from third-
party adjudication, Thibaut and colleagues focused instead on the formal 
procedures that people used to determine outcomes.38 They found in their 
experiments that certain types of procedures produced higher or lower per-
ceptions of fairness, depending upon whether people knew their position or 
not.39 This focus on procedure-as-justice initiated a new branch of social 
psychology, which Thibaut and Walker sketched out the following year in 
their seminal book, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (1975).40 
The social-psychological study of procedural justice has exploded since 
Thibaut and Walker’s seminal work. E. Allan Lind and Tom R. Tyler ad-
vanced the project significantly in their 1988 book, The Social Psychology of 
Procedural Justice.41 Their work shifted the theoretical basis of an individu-
al’s interest in the value of process from controlling outcomes in contexts of 
 
 33. See id. at 453–55. 
 34. Id. at 453. 
 35. See id. at 464. 
 36. See id. at 456. 
 37. See John Thibaut, Lauren Walker, Stephen LaTour & Pauline Houlden, Procedural 
Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974). 
 38. Id. at 1272–73. 
 39. Id. at 1278–79, 1285–89. Thibaut and colleagues sought to understand the compara-
tive advantages of adversarial versus inquisitorial adjudication procedures. Specifically, they 
sought to understand whether participants rated one conflict resolution system as more just 
than another—especially those features of a system considered to advantage those at a disad-
vantage in an adjudication. The authors acknowledged all of the ways in which it was impossi-
ble to create an “original position” in the lab, but they still believed their exercise to be useful. 
Their basic finding was that people who do not know their position beforehand are more likely 
to choose procedures that provide benefits to those at a disadvantage. Id. at 1288. 
 40. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1975). 
 41. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE (1988). 
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uncertainty, an instrumental approach, to an identity hypothesis emphasiz-
ing social relations within a group, which emphasizes relational concerns.42 
According to this “Group Value Model,” people look to key aspects of pro-
cess to gather information about how authorities view them and the group 
or groups to which they belong.43 The Group Value Model stands in stark 
contrast to Thibaut and Walker’s interpretation of people’s interest in pro-
cess. Lind and Tyler conclude that relational considerations generally matter 
more to people than instrumental ones as they reach conclusions about the 
fairness of authorities.44 
Procedural justice researchers have identified four factors that people 
focus on when assessing the fairness of authorities.45 The first two factors 
concern aspects of treatment that people perceive as fair. People care about 
voice and participation, and they also care about being treated with dignity 
and respect.46 People report higher levels of satisfaction in encounters with 
authorities when they have an opportunity to explain their situation and per-
spective on that situation, and this is true even when people are aware that 
their participation will not impact the outcome.47 In addition to being taken 
seriously and listened to, people also desire to be treated with dignity, with 
respect for their rights, and with politeness. The next two factors pertain to 
the fairness of decisionmaking by authorities. That is, people tend to evaluate 
the decisionmaking process of authorities, and they also attempt to evaluate 
the trustworthiness of the decisionmakers’ motives.48 With respect to deci-
sionmaking fairness, people look to indicia of decisionmaker neutrality, ob-
jectivity and factuality of decisionmaking, consistency in decisionmaking, 
and transparency.49 For example, it is important that, in an interaction with 
a member of the public, a legal authority takes the time to explain that the 
motivations of the authorities are sincere, benevolent, and well-intentioned. 
Basically, members of the public want to believe that the authority they are 
dealing with believes that they count. 
Writing alone, Tyler connected the procedural justice research to public 
perceptions of legitimacy of authorities. In Why People Obey the Law, Tyler 
showed empirically that public reliance on procedural justice factors could 
lead to legal compliance.50 Later work expanded the conception of legitimacy 
 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992). 
 45. See Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Jus-
tice: Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 747, 749 
(2003). 
 46. See id. at 747. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. at 748. 
 49. See id.  
 50. See TYLER, supra note 12. 
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beyond compliance to include cooperation and engagement.51 As a general 
matter, research on procedural justice has grown to explore its salience as a 
critical aspect of how people come to conclusions about the fairness of both 
legal authorities and the law itself. For example, while Tyler’s initial model 
was developed through a panel survey of Chicagoans, further work has es-
tablished the importance of procedural-justice-based fairness assessments to 
individuals residing in twenty-six countries with very different types of gov-
ernment structures,52 to minority group members reporting negative experi-
ences with police and courts,53 and even to individuals with serious criminal 
legal system exposure.54 
We think it is fair to say there is a broad, solid research basis for the 
proposition that there is widespread consensus among different groups and 
across cultures about what constitutes fairness—at least insofar as people 
consider their views of the fairness of authorities along the lines of procedur-
al justice theory.55 But, the research on racial bias referenced at the outset of 
this piece raises an important question: Despite the fact that different groups 
appear to agree about what constitutes fairness in how authorities treat 
them, do we also find that members of groups, in coming to conclusions 
about the fairness and legitimacy of authorities, want those authorities to 
treat members of groups to which they do not belong consistent with those 
same principles? In short, do people want procedural justice for others?56 
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There’s a lot riding on this question. Recently, policy circles have em-
phasized the possibility that procedurally just policies, strategies, and train-
ing might address or ameliorate negative interactions some groups, 
particularly groups of color, have with legal authorities such as police.57 One 
would hope that the research base concerning the relationship between pro-
cedural justice as fairness and intergroup relations would be extensive. Sur-
prisingly, though, the research here is not very robust. A handful of studies 
by Tyler and various colleagues explore the extent to which a commitment to 
justice across groups will predict that when people see police injustice, 
whether directed at members of their own group or at members of other 
groups, they will view police as less legitimate and will be therefore less likely 
to cooperate with them. Studies in two different contexts, racial profiling of 
ordinary crime and policing focused on terrorism, support this prediction.58 
A study by Huo outside of the legal-authority context is also relevant.59 
Huo conducted a lab study among university students to understand when, 
why, and in what ways people deny certain kinds of goods to members of 
groups to which they themselves did not belong.60 Participants had to make 
decisions about allocating three types of goods to groups described as having 
values that either aligned or conflicted with their group identity.61 The first 
group was an honor society-type group open to students interested in intel-
lectual exchange and especially encouraging minority group members’ and 
women’s participation. A second group was described as politically oriented, 
discouraging academic focus, and dedicated to promoting white supremacy. 
The goods in question were monetary support (economic), an opportunity 
to distribute flyers in support of one’s position (procedural “voice”), and an 
assessment of how authorities should treat members of different groups (re-
lational).62 Huo found that identity concerns did drive instrumental judg-
ments: participants discriminated against the unlike group and withheld 
monetary support.63 Yet Huo also found that study participants were least 
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likely to withhold relational goods from the out-group.64 With respect to re-
lational goods, there was almost no distinction between the respondents’ as-
sessment of the kind of treatment authorities should afford the two different 
target groups.65 Additionally, respondents were reluctant to deny procedural 
goods such as “voice” to the out-group, but the effect was not quite as strong 
as it was concerning relational goods.66 
This study is the strongest piece of evidence that we could find demon-
strating that members of one group support relational goods for members of 
another group—even a group representing values for which respondents 
profoundly disagree, which in this case is white supremacy. There are limita-
tions, however, to applying this study to our notion of caste legitimacy. We 
do not know whether the way participants considered the misalignment be-
tween themselves and the fictional white supremacist group in the study op-
erates in the same way that racial identity in the real world does. There are 
further questions about whether the participants are representative and their 
behaviors generalizable. The fact that the study is singular also gives us 
pause. These are all issues of external validity. 
To review, the caste thesis of legitimacy implies little to no identification 
of in-groups with out-groups. And caste legitimacy in U.S. law has proceed-
ed in explicit racial terms, as we noted at the outset of this Essay. Applying 
these ideas to Huo’s work, we might expect respondents in Huo’s experi-
ment to be less willing to extend relational and procedural goods to a Black 
Nationalist group as opposed to the fictional target group in the study. On 
the other hand, the small group of studies conducted by Tyler in the policing 
context suggests that members of majority groups extend their commit-
ments to justice to include procedural justice for minority groups. To us, the 
psychological research pertaining to how people think about race is critical 
to adjudicate an answer to the external validity question given the clear pau-
city of research. We turn to that in the next section. 
II. THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF RACISM  
There has been a large, diverse body of resistance thought in oral tradi-
tion, literature, art, music, and other forms of human expression countering 
the racist epistemologies and practices of imperialist European liberalism. 
Much of this work has been carried out in the United States, by people en-
slaved or encasted by American law and custom. Frederick Douglass, the 
best-known orator of the nineteenth century, exposed the fallacies of scien-
tific racism, the myth of American exceptionalism, and most of all, the para-
dox of chattel slavery within an allegedly Christian republic.67 At the same 
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time, Sojourner Truth, and later, Anna Julia Cooper, articulated theories of 
intersectionality, reframing gender and race as co-constructing categories of 
domination that also belied liberal republican claims to benevolence and 
fairness.68 Through music, literature, and activism, Sioux Zitkála-Šá explored 
the duality of liberalism and cultural genocide in her own Native American 
identity formation.69 And by the mid-twentieth century, Black radical schol-
ars including Claudia Jones, Oliver C. Cox, and others exposed the connec-
tions between capitalism and racism, while Franz Fanon and others critiqued 
racial coloniality.70 
In terms of the early twentieth century development of the theory and 
social science of racism, W.E.B. Du Bois built the most robust body of aca-
demic scholarship, deploying social science and historical analysis on the 
contours of the American caste system, simultaneously disproving and ex-
plaining the workings of racial caste within an ostensibly democratic repub-
lic.71 His work proposed two important psychological theories: first, the two-
ness of civic experience as a person labeled as Black, which he described as 
life “[b]eneath the veil;”72 and second, whiteness as a kind of “wage” or psy-
chological benefit to people labeled as white, for the maintenance of which 
they will support policies that run counter to their own economic self-
interest.73 Over the course of his life and scholarship, Du Bois’s analysis of 
American caste shifted from an optimistic account of the duality of Ameri-
can caste and American democracy to a pessimistic view that the latter 
would never overcome the former (a shift paralleled in the work and life of 
Derrick Bell).74 Critical Race Theory, so-named, developed among law 
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school students and faculty in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the failures 
of the Brown decision and other liberal legal reforms to successfully disman-
tle racial caste after the Supreme Court repudiated its place in formal law.75 
In essence, the question we pose in this Essay reflects that enduring tension 
in these traditions: that American political culture is, at its core, a struggle 
between democratic ideals and the maintenance of white settlerist privi-
lege.76 Though we agree with Black feminist tradition that oppression oper-
ates as a matrix of intersectional identities, for reasons of economy, our focus 
in this Essay is the social psychology of racism.77 
Throughout the twentieth century the branch of social psychology called 
“intergroup relations” engaged race and racism directly. In the early decades, 
American psychologists played an ignominious managerial role in white su-
premacy, often in relation to white domination of education for Black peo-
ple. Pseudoscientific claims of race psychology reinforced racial conceptions 
of intelligence, argued that segregation by race was natural, and buttressed a 
softer social Darwinism that framed European culture and society as the 
apex of human social evolution.78 During the interwar years, however, overt-
ly racist psychology declined in the face of withering scientific critique, 
alarm at European fascism, and a growing willingness among psychologists 
to engage in public activism.79 For example, Otto Klineberg’s research on 
Native American and Black student achievement exploded myths of race-
based intelligence,80 and John Dollard exposed the benefits of everyday rac-
ism to whites in his psycho-ethnography of a southern town.81 In the dec-
ades after the Second World War, psychological research on the intersection 
of individuals and antidemocratic political systems included significant work 
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on racial prejudice—most conspicuously Gordon Allport’s The Nature of 
Prejudice (1954).82 While much more sophisticated than the early race-based 
pseudoscience, the second generation researchers’ conception of prejudice 
was based on overly optimistic assumptions regarding the inevitable triumph 
of democratic values, the ascendancy of research-informed policy, and the 
desire of out-groups to assimilate into the dominant social paradigm.83 Even 
during the civil rights era, the dominant view among intergroup psychology 
researchers was that legal reform would inevitably create the necessary social 
context for the steady erosion of racism.84 
More recently the psychological study of racial prejudice has exploded. 
This research comprises many hundreds of studies using multiple methods, 
generating endogenous subfields within psychology and also raising pro-
found challenges to exogenous fields such as law, philosophy, education, 
criminal justice, and more.85 Much of this work is framed by the paradox 
that, since the 1970s, overt racism has declined in public discourse of legiti-
mate governance (the fascist politics of the Trump-era Republican Party 
notwithstanding), yet racial inequality endures and, by some measures, has 
worsened.86 A critical observation in the work on the psychology of racism is 
its recognition of the centrality of “sociostructural forces in creating and 
maintaining racial bias and biased outcomes.”87 We see race, at its core, as a 
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social construction that serves the psychological purpose of justifying ine-
quality. In the twentieth century legal transition from white democracy to 
color-blind democracy, Americans rewrote laws to eliminate overt racialism 
in text but did not address the cultures or structures of caste that the law had 
already aided and abetted for centuries and now maintains in its ordinary 
operation.88 
The study of justice in a liberal democracy presupposes universal com-
mitments to its tenets; but the social psychology of racism presents signifi-
cant challenges to this supposition. We briefly highlight four areas of social-
psychological theory and topical research that raise questions about whether 
the group value thesis of procedural justice will extend across racial groups 
and, in particular, extend from white people to Black people. The thrust of 
this work potentially impairs the proposed value of policy innovations to 
promote procedural justice and even democratic approaches generally, 
which has important implications for how Americans think about justice 
writ large. 
A. Commitment to Hierarchy 
In the last thirty years, researchers have developed two theories in par-
ticular that raise questions about broad commitments to democratic legiti-
macy. The first, Social Dominance Theory (SDT), is a comprehensive theory 
that seeks to explain how group-based social hierarchies (not exclusively 
race-based ones) are maintained through individual discrimination, institu-
tional discrimination, and behavioral asymmetry that is largely guided by 
ideology.89 The theory posits that members of socially dominant groups will 
legitimize and maintain their dominance by supporting policies that reinforce 
their group advantage, seeking out social roles where they can police the inter-
ests of their group status (including, importantly, working as police offic-
ers),90 and engaging in overt and discrete acts of discrimination against 
nondominant groups. 
Ideologies are central to SDT, and researchers explore how dominance is 
supported by legitimizing myths, such as race, gender, and meritocracy. Em-
pirically, researchers have developed scales of Social Dominance Orientation 
(SDO) to measure the extent to which individuals prefer hierarchical versus 
egalitarian group relations. These scales are highly predictive of a person’s 
identification with a hierarchical group position, their commitments to legit-
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imizing myths, and their judgments of the undeservingness of other groups 
they view as threatening to their position.91 
In contrast to SDT, Aversive Racism Theory (ART) seeks to account for 
the discriminatory behavior of individuals who hold egalitarian values. This 
body of research demonstrates that white people who identify as socially lib-
eral and do not hold explicitly racist views can nevertheless score high in im-
plicit bias measures and behave in ways that reinforce the racist systems they 
oppose.92 As Dovidio and Gaertner explain, aversive racism is not driven by 
the desire to dominate Black people, but by subconscious negative feelings 
toward them (such as discomfort, disgust, and fear) that result in preferential 
treatment toward whites.93 Aversive racism is most salient in situations 
where rules and procedures are not clear, 94 suggesting an interesting and 
important relationship between ART and theories of process-based fairness. 
Unlike older theories of racism, both Social Dominance Theory and Ra-
cial Aversion Theory posit hierarchy-maintaining behaviors as natural, not 
pathological.95 Both social dominance and aversive racism result in the 
maintenance of white supremacy. But it’s not clear what their relationship is 
to conscious and subconscious commitments to procedural justice. An inter-
esting study by De Cremer, Cornelis, and Van Hiel demonstrates that people 
with high SDO scores value voice, one component of procedural fairness, in 
their interactions with authorities more than those with lower scores.96 This 
study notwithstanding, there is not a research base exploring the intersec-
tions of SDT, ART, and procedural justice. We think the field is ripe for this 
kind of intersecting exploration— especially as it pertains to policy-relevant 
studies. 
We next review studies in policy-relevant domains that we think raise 
critical questions about the power of advancing procedural justice strategies 
and policy in criminal legal reform by demonstrating the persistence of con-
scious and unconscious forms of caste-maintenance. To us, the question is 
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the extent to which these conscious and unconscious commitments to hier-
archy can be overcome by democratic legitimacy. 
B. Suspicion and Danger 
There is nearly eighty years of psychological research documenting ste-
reotypical association in the United States between Black people and crimi-
nality.97 In a classic 1980 study, Sagar and Schofield found that Black and 
white male sixth graders interpreted Black and white stimulus performers 
engaged in ambiguous aggressive behavior differently—both sets of children 
rated the Black actors’ actions as being more mean and aggressive than those 
of the white actors.98 In a 2017 study, Wilson and colleagues found that 
white people perceive images of young Black men as being physically larger 
and more dangerous than those of young white men, and consequently fa-
vored greater hypothetical use of force against them (the effect was less pro-
nounced among Black participants than white ones, especially in perceptions 
of dangerousness).99 The advent of subconscious processing research has 
taken this work a step further: even thinking about people who are Black can 
lead to thoughts of crime and to split-second misapprehensions of their be-
havior as more suspicious and more dangerous.100 Likewise, thinking about 
crime and violence (primed subconsciously with an image of a gun) can lead 
to thinking about Black people.101 
Insofar as procedural justice relies upon the notion that those who inter-
act are reliably ordered individuals, perceptions of a group as being inher-
ently disordered also raise potential problems. In their study of 500 city 
block groups in Chicago, for example, Sampson and Raudenbush found that 
all racial groups associated the presence of racial minorities with a form of 
disorder, irrespective of observable physical characteristics of the place.102 
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Moreover, these same forms of mistrust and suspicion can be activated polit-
ically through the use “dog whistles” that tap into white racial fears—of 
Black Americans, of Spanish-speaking immigrants, or of Muslims, for exam-
ple. While the use of symbolic political language has occurred across nation-
al contexts and across forms of difference, its use in activating caste 
legitimacy has been a key feature of American politics since the late 1960s.103 
C. Punishment 
In a broad study of intergroup dynamics, Newheiser, Sawaoka, and 
Dovidio found that research participants who believed out-group members 
were highly cohesive and like-minded tended to be more suspicious of those 
out-group members’ moral commitments and, as a result, recommended 
harsher retributive justice for culpable individual members of that group.104 
In a society where many white people live largely segregated lives and hold 
disproportionate power, this form of generalized out-group suspicion and 
proclivity to punish can be especially costly to racial minorities, and this 
study is hardly singular.105 Many studies find that white Americans support 
harsher punishment for Black people relative to white people. Using a na-
tionally representative sample including 735 white Americans, for example, 
Rattan and colleagues found that participants judged adolescents who are 
Black to be more culpable and favored sentencing them more harshly than 
white adolescents.106 Holding facts of the cases constant, Glaser, Martin and 
Kahn found that juries were more likely to find Black defendants guilty for 
the same crime when the death penalty was an option; that effect was the 
opposite for white defendants.107 Moreover, these associations with black-
ness are not binary but colorist, so that even among people identified as 
“Black,” darker skin tone and certain facial features attract increased pun-
ishment.108 In a study of capital cases in Philadelphia, Eberhardt and col-
leagues examined photos of defendants and found that in cases in which the 
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victim was white, the extent to which the defendant appeared more stereo-
typically Black predicted imposition of the death penalty.109 In two linked 
studies, Hetey and Eberhardt found that the white voters they interviewed in 
New York and San Francisco expressed more support for harsh laws when 
presented with visual or statistical evidence that the population affected by 
the policies was more “Black.”110 
D. Deservingness 
At the same time that Thibaut and Walker were developing a distinctive 
field of procedural justice, psychologists who studied the effects of relative 
deprivation on fairness judgments theorized “deservingness” as a key modu-
lating mechanism. In her classic study of working women and job discrimi-
nation, for example, Faye Crosby found that despite objective evidence of 
extreme wage discrimination, her participants modulated their judgments 
through a sense of that they thought they deserved as members of their in-
group.111 The effect of deservingness has been found in multiple justice con-
texts in which people evaluate injustice for others, too. For example, people 
have been found to justify injustice to other individuals by activating out-of-
context evidence—making appeals to “ultimate justice” in the long term, 
even if the particular result is unjust, or “immanent justice,” by which a cur-
rent injustice is justified based on causally unrelated perceived past mis-
deeds.112 
Deservingness may also affect fairness judgments about whole groups. 
In a 2019 Daedalus essay, Bloemraad, Kymlicka, Lamont, and Son Hing de-
veloped a multidisciplinary account for why, across Western societies gener-
ally, increasing diversity and inclusivity in the social sphere in the last fifty 
years has been accompanied by a curtailment of the social rights of citizen-
ship for the poor and racialized minorities.113 In short, they find greater di-
versity increases the weaponization of deservingness arguments against 
distributive justice by race and social class.114 
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Does deservingness affect people’s evaluation of the legitimacy of au-
thorities based on how authorities treat racial others? While we do not know, 
it seems plausible and would lend credence to the idea that caste legitimacy 
could continue to play a significant role in how Americans think about pro-
cedural justice. 
III. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? RESEARCH AND REFORM 
Much of the research we have reviewed in this Essay is either directed 
toward or designed to influence policy in ways that mute or disable caste le-
gitimacy. This is true whether the research is based in procedural justice or 
focused on problems of intergroup relations pertinent to prejudice and dis-
crimination. Our view is that reading the lines of research together, along 
with a thoroughgoing commitment to theory, can better inform policy in-
struments, strategy, and proposals in ways that can make them more suc-
cessful. One contribution that scholars of procedural justice have made to 
criminal legal system reform is to question the theoretical premises of its op-
eration, whether stated or unstated.115 Like the early social psychologists ref-
erenced in this Essay who believed that it was possible to overcome the social 
dynamics that lead to race discrimination through law and policy, we still are 
hopeful that law, policy and institutions properly constructed can advance 
the project of democratic legitimacy. But those interventions must be atten-
tive to the dynamics that impede them. Our primary goal in this last section 
is to raise some questions for a research agenda explicitly targeted at the dis-
juncture we have identified and discuss some implications of such an agen-
da. We then conclude with an old saw. 
A. Asking the Right Questions 
There is one obvious first step in carrying out research that is attentive 
to potential impact of both American traditions of legitimacy. Procedural 
justice researchers must account in their models for the ways in which the 
persistent structure of racial injustice specifically limits the extent we can ex-
pect legal authorities who are committed to procedural justice tenets to carry 
them out. While it is true that procedural justice is primarily an intragroup 
theory, researchers could be more sensitive to intergroup concerns when de-
signing studies, especially if their goal is to be more policy-relevant. The op-
eration of criminal legal systems, for example, necessarily implicates how in- 
and out-groups view one another, and it is perhaps more important in these 
contexts to consider how social-dominance concerns affect results.116 As an 
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example, procedural justice researchers could test explicitly the extent to 
which research subjects from one group, and especially a group considered 
dominant in accord with Social Dominance Theory, are willing to accord 
procedural justice “goods” to down group members along the lines of the 
hypothetical twist on Yuen Huo’s Berkeley study we suggested above. 
In turn, researchers focusing primarily on intergroup relations might 
consider whether and how being attentive to process concerns and fairness 
ameliorates the negative consequences of bias. In a series of studies, Goff and 
colleagues have demonstrated that the fear of being perceived as racist actu-
ally provokes the use of force among police officers.117 The authors argue 
that self-legitimacy, where legitimacy is grounded in ideas akin to procedural 
justice, is an important predictor of resolving interactions with little to no 
force, because “officers must wield power in a way that mirrors their self-
beliefs about their position in society as fair and equitable agents of the rule 
of law.”118 Consistent with that idea, the question was whether self-
legitimacy would blunt the impact of stereotype threat on use of force. The 
authors found that it did, but only partially.119 More work in this vein would 
be helpful to test the power of procedural-justice-based interventions, strate-
gy, and policy. 
Additionally, there is a need more generally to assess the explanatory 
power of both racial bias and procedural justice contextually and situational-
ly. Much psychological research is carried out in laboratory settings, and this 
makes it difficult to assess the extent to which the important dynamics these 
researchers uncover operate in the day-to-day. With respect to this last 
point, we take Jill Swencionis and Philip Atiba Goff’s framework for under-
standing racial bias in policing as a potential model, which they described in 
a recent article.120 There the authors point out that both personal and situa-
tional factors present risks of discrimination in policing. They helpfully array 
such psychological routes to discriminations such as social dominance orien-
tation, aversive racism, and Black-crime associations (to name three catego-
ries discussed in this Essay) against common policing situations that present 
potential for officers to enact discrimination, such as high-discretion deci-
 
extent that her research based in intergroup relations demonstrates resistance by white people 
to policies that could change the trajectory of racial inequality, we theorize that integration of 
procedural fairness approaches in the research could potentially blunt the negative impacts of 
bias. 
 117. Rick Trinkner, Erin M. Kerrison & Phillip Atiba Goff, The Force of Fear: Police Ste-
reotype Threat, Self-Legitimacy, and Support for Excessive Force, 43 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 421 
(2019); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 115, 126–128 (2014); PHILLIP ATIBA GOFF, KARIN DANIELLE MARTIN & MEREDITH 
GAMSON SMIEDT, CONSORTIUM FOR POLICE LEADERSHIP IN EQUITY, PROTECTING EQUITY: 
THE CONSORTIUM FOR POLICE LEADERSHIP IN EQUITY REPORT ON THE SAN JOSE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (2013). 
 118. Trinkner, Kerrison, & Goff, supra note 117, at 424. 
 119. Id. at 431. 
 120. Jillian K. Swencionis & Phillip Atiba Goff, The Psychological Science of Racial Bias 
and Policing, 23 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 398 (2017). 
May 2021] The Wolf We Feed 117 
sionmaking, cognitive demand, and whether the officer is a novice.121 To this 
two-by-two model researchers could add a third axis, Z, and assess how pro-
cedural justice impacts and, by hypothesis, potentially ameliorates the im-
pact of a potential route of discrimination. 
B. Thinking About Method 
Much of the psychological research on prejudice, whether social domi-
nance or implicit bias, relies on primes. Priming is a form of stimulus that 
focuses the brain in ways that shape the types of associations it makes (ideal-
ly in the same modality, such as visual primes in advance of visual infor-
mation). In a sense, priming is a form of manipulation—shaping both the 
information we select for noticing and the ways we interpret that infor-
mation.122 Some of the work on the psychology of race we have reviewed 
here uses photos of people or other images to prime research subjects.123 
Dovidio and colleagues primed subjects through auditory means.124 While 
we have seen that priming can work to activate prejudice, it stands to reason 
that priming also can be deployed to counter it. We think it is important to 
explore this possibility. For example, there are studies of the relationship be-
tween forgiveness and justice in which researchers attempt to assess whether 
thinking about justice—both procedural and distributional—advances or im-
pedes forgiveness.125 But we have not uncovered research relying upon pro-
cedural justice primes to assess how it might mitigate the risk of caste 
legitimizing behavior. Following this line of thinking, we hypothesize that a 
targeted procedural justice prime could activate egalitarian commitments 
that presumably are already quite strong in some groups, as the research on 
aversive racism indicates. The question would then be whether priming pro-
cedural justice among members of this group could overcome strong implic-
it bias. Moreover, utilizing primes in this way could also facilitate more 
contextual assessment of both theories of justice and discrimination in con-
junction, as Goff and Swencionis urge. Policy instruments, we think, could 
potentially operate as “primes” themselves. 
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C. Thinking More About Time 
Because laboratory research focuses on understanding mechanisms, one 
perennial criticism pertains to whether these laboratory findings are exter-
nally valid—namely, can lab findings be replicated in the real world. Re-
searchers seek to address these concerns by relying on subjects of concern in 
lab settings or by taking experiments out of the lab to large scale survey sam-
ples involving heterogeneous groups as opposed to just university under-
graduates. Even these laudable approaches have weaknesses. The many 
apparatuses necessary to disable the pernicious effects of naturalized ap-
proaches to maintaining hierarchy will require intervention and work at the 
individual, institutional, and societal levels, and the effects of these various 
strategies will impact individuals in different ways. This might just be a 
complicated way of recognizing that time is a relevant dimension for think-
ing about how the psychology of procedural justice and racial bias interact. 
Consider some evidence concerning this last point. At the individual 
level there is, for example, evidence that training people in authority, espe-
cially criminal justice workers, to recognize and manage their trigger points 
in their professional interactions holds promise for increasing the quality of 
interactions with civilians of color.126 And on the macro, sociological, and 
political levels, developing more sophisticated understandings of the activat-
ing mechanisms for democratic or caste legitimacy potentially assists our 
ability to counter inflammatory political rhetoric. Important questions with 
respect to both of these strategies pertain to time. How much training? How 
long does the training last? How powerful and durable are our methods to 
engage countervailing pressures in support of caste legitimacy? All of these 
questions implicate the reality that whatever we do in this arena, we will not 
see results overnight. We cannot reverse the structures that reinforce the 
negative consequences of intergroup relations on a dime. 
CONCLUSION 
The individual and structural dynamics that have built both the cultural 
determinants of our preferences for process-based fairness that support 
democratic legitimacy and also laid the foundations of caste legitimacy are 
long-standing, durable, invisible, and yet pervasive. Recognition of this dy-
namic requires persistence and perseverance. Any strategy we adopt to fully 
entrench an ideal version of justice will require a list of approaches writ large 
and writ small—all of which must accrete over time. There is no other path 
forward. A popular parable attributed to the Cherokee and Lenape oral tra-
ditions captures the nature of this work. In every person’s heart, the story 
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goes, there is an ongoing fight between two wolves. One wolf is evil, repre-
senting all the worst attributes of humanity: rage, arrogance, self-pity, cruel-
ty, deceitfulness, fear, and greed. The other is good, representing kindness, 
humility, peace, joy, truthfulness, hope, and generosity. Who wins the fight 
in our hearts? The wolf we feed. 
  
120 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 119:95 
 
